Technocracy satisfies nobody
Singapore shows why technocracy is not a free-lunch nor a likely equilibrium
Tyler Cowen recently pointificated on the decline in relative status of Singapore. Only a decade ago was this island city-state held as an exemplary model amongst the right. Here in Britain, brexiteers never mention a “Singapore on Thames” vision anymore, with a xenophobic Trumpian populism superseding in the form of Reform. I think this not only encapsulates how the right has descended into tribalist nationalism, but also the decline in status of “successful” autocracies, and technocracy itself. Ultimately, this yields important lessons on the difficulties of establishing governance from first principles.
Why technocracy is incompatible with autocracy
Singapore is essentially ruled by elite human capital on steroids. With elite human capital converging towards globalisation and a lax attitude to immigration, whilst the right (and to a lesser extent the left too) are pivoting away from these principles, Singapore increasingly represents the sort of establishment “neoliberalism” that is widely condemned today. Amongst those most sympathetic towards globalisation, of a libertarian or classical liberal inclination, the authoritarianism of the PAP repels them. Indeed, whilst Singapore holds free and fair elections coupled with stringent libel regulations and gerrymandering, this is a nation that bans chewing gum and sends people to prison for three years for smoking a joint. Corporal punishment, cast aside as a human rights violation or parental abuse in the West, is a ubiquitous feature of school discipline and the legal system.
Hence, Singapore yields a more autocratic reputation than it deserves. Whilst the ruling party has been dominant on supermajorities since its independence, look at the electoral map of any large city in a democracy, and a single party tends to dominate. Rather than an aberration, one party holding a local monopoly on urban politics in many cities is the norm. Nonetheless, its autocratic reputation renders Singapore the go-to example for autocrats to justify the merits of autocracy over democracy, which further undermines Singapore's reputation amongst liberals.
Yet an EHC autocracy is rare: most autocrats obtain legitimacy via grand Manichean ideological narratives, sectarianism, or kleptocratic rent-seeking amongst the ruling class. In the absence of manipulating our primitive in vs out zero-sum sentiments, they tend to survive by providing sufficient opportunities for brazen corruption amongst public sector officials. Often they rely on conspiracy theories and relentless disinformation campaigns, as we see with MAGA and Putin, whilst Singapore prohibits anything resembling a whiff of deception in its public discourse. Therefore autocracies tend to select against technocracy, even if in equilibrium competition with democracies restrain the worst impulses of many. Even the Gulf States, the other examples of “succesful” autocracies, institutionalise nepotism, which generates inefficient misallocation. The failure of NEOM and the billions poured into indefinitely cancelled projects in Dubai are testament to this. Much of the space in their completed skyscrapers remains empty.
Neoreactionaries long advocated for a network of authoritarian technocratic city-states, but now its apparent that dictatorship tends to be incompatible with technocracy. From Putin miscalculating the ease of conquering Ukraine, to Xi's revanchist nationalism scaring away global investors, the lacklustre performance of “succesful” authoritarian models are clear. As a result, the neoreactionary movement has disintegrated; either merging with the small-l liberal rationalist community, or (as with Yarvin) aligning with MAGA. As democracy emerges as superior, there is a corresponding decline in Singapore being cited as an illiberal model state. As those embracing autocratic tendencies are rejecting technocratic EHC, there is no need to point to Singapore, which shows that everything they hate is consistent with prosperity.
Why technocracy is inferior to democracy
Even if a technocratic dictatorship, that implemented every since one of my policy prescriptions, was feasible, I am increasingly turning against such. I live in a country where the relentless expansion of the policing of speech and association basically mirrors Singapore's policing of speech deemed offensive or misinformation. Send out a poorly-worded tweet impulsively, and jail time becomes a realistic prospect. Retweeting a tweet later shown to be false, that's spreading misinformation, which in “sensitive” times is grounds for arrest. I cannot even read many Substacks without having to verify my identity. Public order offences also mirror Singapore's restrictions on protest.
If these onerous speech restrictions were in place throughout Covid, then anyone with a sensible objection to masks or lockdowns would be detained for “threatening the safety of the public”. Indeed, the lockdowns themselves were the case of a select minority of medical professionals engaging in central planning across the entire economy and society, to keep the public safe. Likewise, misinformation laws open up opportunities for arbitrary arrest and politically-motivated persecution. Misinformation over biological sex was tolerated throughout the great awokening. The temptation for any benevolent social planner to deviate from technocracy to use such laws for their own rent-seeking or political gains is too strong. There cannot be a credible commitment to neutrally enforce speech restrictions.
We should be grateful for living in liberal democracies, despite the inherent degree of some disorderly chaos that such endogenously generates. There is something to be said for life in a less immaculate environment, but with more scope for pursuing cultural interests without worrying about causing offence. With the British government cracking down on vaping, floating bans for tobacco, and zero-proof beverages, we are increasingly resembling Singapore in nanny statism. Singapore maintains a reputation for boredom for a reason - with the exception of Hawker Centres, their paternalistic stifling of public life exerts a downstream effect on entertainment, hospitality, and nightlife.
One underrated reason why the right has fallen out of love with Singapore is also that Singapore practices wokeness on steroids. Their speech restrictions are justified on the basis of promoting racial harmony in a multicultural society. To this end, they adopt racial quotas in parliamentary seats, for presidential terms, and even in allocating public housing (the vast majority of the housing stock in Singapore). Whilst justified not on perceived structural discrimination but for the purpose of maintaining public security (especially as racial riots are salient in the historical legacy of the nation), the overreach is as ominous as the worst moments of the great awokening. Again, if elites side with woke ideology, then this is further grounds for rejecting technocracy.
Singapore as a charter city, and on why governments rarely arise from first-principles
Recently, the Gulf States are eroding the attention that Singapore receives, yet they are not the only competition that Singapore faces. Charter cities, seasteading institutes, and the general nascent movement to establish small nation states, are inspired largely by Singapore. However, most of these projects are floundering. Very few are voting with their feet to move to such locales.
Singapore arose into existence as an independent city-state due to unique historical circumstances. Ethnic tensions forced a breakaway from Malaysia, and Lee Kuan Yew maintained a sufficiently strong grip on power (able to unite multiple ethnic and ideological groups by emphasising a non-dogmatic pragmatic approach to governing) to transform Singapore in his own image. The extent of Singapore's transformation into a wealthy charter-city today is largely a product of historical contingency, and chance. Imagine if the leader was not Lee Kuan Yew, but Assad or Saddam Hussein (also faced with multiple ethnic groups yet pandering to sectarianism)? Singapore could have very easily turned into a failed state.
In general, I am tending to the idea that all political equilibria across and within nations are constrained by path-dependent cultural and historical contingencies. The failure of most charter cities demonstrates that first-principles thinking, the basis for technocracy, is often by itself insufficient. As this realisation, via repeated experiments with microstates, the more we see Singapore as a unique product of circumstance that will never arise again. This reduces the payoff of citing Singapore as an example in political discourse, and also should update one towards endogenising political constraints when evaluating policy. As intellectuals, we like to suggest what is optimal, yet the set of possible outcomes is finite.